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CRIMINAL LAW-Capital Sentencing Jurors May Be
Informed About A Defendant's Period Of Parole
Ineligibility: Clark v. Tansy
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Clark v. Tansy,' the New Mexico Supreme Court vacated Terry
Clark's death sentence.2 The court held that when a prosecutor urges a
defendant's future dangerousness as cause for imposing the death penalty,
due process assures the defendant an opportunity to inform the jury of
the period of his parole ineligibility.' Furthermore, the court held that
trial courts must sentence the defendant 4 for the noncapital charges against
him if the defendant chooses to present the length of that sentence to
the jury in order to rebut the prosecution's argument for the death
penalty.' This note reviews New Mexico and United States Supreme Court
decisions relevant to the capital sentencing procedures utilized in Clark,
examines the rationale of Clark, and explores the effect of this decision
on capital sentencing procedures in New Mexico.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In State v. Clark,6 Terry D. Clark received the death penalty for the
kidnapping and first degree murder of Dena Lynn Gore. 7 Clark raped
and murdered nine-year-old Gore while released on bond pending appeal
of a prior conviction. 8 After Clark pleaded guilty to Gore's murder, a
capital jury sentenced him to death. 9

1. 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527 (1994) [hereinafter Clark II].
2. Clark II, 118 N.M. at 495, 882 P.2d at 536. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(D) (Repl.
Pamp. 1994) (providing that no error in sentencing shall result in reversal of a capital felony
conviction). On appeal, if the trial court is reversed because of error in the sentencing proceeding,
the Supreme Court shall remand solely for a new sentencing hearing. Id.
3. Id. at 492, 882 P.2d at 533.
4. See State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 659, 789 P.2d 603, 607 (1990), overruled by Clark
v. Tansy, 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527 (1994) (holding that the court should, if requested, either
impose sentence for collateral noncapital offenses or give the possible range of sentences for those
offenses).
5. Clark II, 118 N.M. at 493, 882 P.2d at 534.
6. 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322 (1989) [hereinafter Clark I].
7. Id. at 290, 772 P.2d at 324.
8. Id. While released on appeal bond, Clark was living at his brother's ranch in Chavez County,
New Mexico. Id. On the afternoon of July 17, 1986, Clark abducted Gore near her home in Artesia,
New Mexico. Id. at 291, 772 P.2d at 325. Clark drove Gore to his brother's ranch where he raped
her, shot her in the head, and buried her body in a shallow grave on the ranch. Id. Clark's brother
discovered Gore's body and then notified the authorities who arrested Clark. Id.
9. Clark I, 108 N.M. at 291, 772 P.2d at 325. "[U]pon a plea of guilty to a capital felony,
the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-I(B) (Repl. Pamp.
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment .
1994).
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On direct appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, 10 Clark argued
that the jury's understanding of the sentencing alternatives" was improperly affected by two factors: Clark's ineligibility for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment,2 and the court's delay in sentencing Clark
for his noncapital convictions."' The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed
Clark's death sentence, holding that Clark's Eighth Amendment rights
14
were not violated.
Subsequently, Clark filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 5 in
the district court. 6 Clark alleged that fundamental error occurred during
the capital sentencing phase of trial. After a hearing," the district court
denied Clark relief on the habeas corpus petition. 8 Clark then filed, 9
and was granted, writ 20 to the New Mexico Supreme Court. 2'
III. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
In Furman v. Georgia,22 the United States Supreme Court held that
Georgia's imposition of the death penalty under then existing state statutes
violated the Eighth Amendment 23 prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment. "24 The Furman Court held that capital punishment was being

carried out in an arbitrary manner. 25 In particular, the Court criticized

10. Under New Mexico law, a death sentence is automatically reviewed by
the New Mexico
Supreme Court. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
11. Under the Criminal Sentencing Act, conviction of a capital felony requires
the jury to choose
either a sentence of death or life imprisonment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14
and § 31-20A-I(B)
(Repl. Pamp. 1994).
12. See Probation & Parole Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(A) (Repl. Pamp.
1987) (stating
that an inmate who is sentenced to life imprisonment for the commission of a
capital felony becomes
eligible for a parole hearing after he has served thirty years of his sentence).
13. Clark I, 108 N.M. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327.
14. Id. at 311, 772 P.2d at 345. See also infra note 24.
15. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (stating that "the
essence of habeas
corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody
and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.").
16. Clark II, 118 N.M. at 488, 882 P.2d at 529. Rules 5-802(A) and (D)(1)
of the New Mexico
Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas
corpus by persons
in custody in violation of the New Mexico or United States laws or constitutions.
The petition to
vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, shall be filed in the judicial district
in which the petitioner
was convicted. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-802(D)(1).
17. See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-802(E)(3) and (4) (requiring that the district court
order an evidentiary
hearing on the habeas petition and conduct such hearing as promptly as practicable).
18. Clark II, 118 N.M. at 488, 882 P.2d at 529.
19. See N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-802(G) (providing that if a writ of habeas corpus
is denied, a writ
of certiorari may be filed with the New Mexico Supreme Court).
20. See N.M. R. App. P. 12-501 (governing petitions for issuance of writs
of certiorari seeking
review of district court's denial of habeas corpus petition pursuant to rule 5-802
of the New Mexico
Rules of Criminal Procedure).
21. Clark 11, 118 N.M. at 488, 882 P.2d at 529.
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and usual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
24. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239. But see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(holding that the
death penalty does not per se violate Eighth Amendment prohibitions against
cruel and unusual
punishment). Id. at 169. Instead, the Court found that the Eighth Amendment
places substantial
restrictions upon the states in imposing the death penalty. See generally, id.
at 176-87.
25. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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the unfettered discretion states gave to sentencing juries and judges,
finding the exercise of that discretion "wanton" and "freakishly imposed." ' 26 Since Furman, states have reformed their capital sentencing
procedures to eliminate arbitrariness by adopting procedures designed to
guide sentencing discretion 27 and ensure consideration of the character
28
and record of the individual being sentenced.
The Eighth Amendment requirements of individualized sentencing determinations and guided discretion are designed to ensure reliability in
sentencing, 29 thus avoiding arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.30
In addition, the Eighth Amendment also achieves reliability by providing
sentencing juries with accurate sentencing information as "an indispensable
prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall
live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a
sentencing decision." 3'
The practice of informing jurors in a capital case of post-sentencing
procedures, such as the defendant's parole ineligibility, is sometimes
criticized.1 2 Critics argue that apprising jurors of the defendant's parole
ineligibility introduces an entirely speculative element into deliberations,
thus violating the Eighth Amendment's reliability requirement.33 However,
withholding information about the defendant's parole ineligibility is also
criticized as violating the Eighth Amendment's requirement that the sentencing jury "have before it all possible relevant information about the
individual defendant whose fate it must determine." 3 4 Debate over whether
to inform sentencing jurors about the defendant's parole ineligibility is

26. Id. See also McClesky v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 899 (lth Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (stating that "filn pre-Furman days, there was no rhyme or reason as to who got the death
penalty and who did not.").
27. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (explaining that capital sentencing discretion must be "suitably
directed and limited"). See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (approving Florida's
capital sentencing procedures because the sentencer is given "specific and detailed guidance" in
deciding whether to impose the death penalty).
28. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (explaining that in capital cases
the "fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.").
See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (holding that individualized consideration
means that a sentencer cannot exclude as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence).
29. In Woodson, the Court explained that:
the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
30. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990).
31. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190.
32. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2195 (1994). In Simmons, the State argued
that providing the jury with information about the defendant's parole ineligibility is "inherently
misleading" because "future exigencies such as legislative reform, commutation, clemency, and
escape" might result in the defendant being released into society. Id. at 2195.
33. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment invalidates
"procedural rules that tend to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination.").
34. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
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particularly contentious when the state urges the defendant's future dangerousness as a reason to choose the death penalty.35
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause operates similarly
to the Eighth Amendment in prohibiting the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.3 6 The Due Process Clause is primarily concerned with
evidentiary fairness. Due process guarantees a criminal defendant the
opportunity to present evidence to rebut the prosecution's case for death,
thus permitting sentencing jurors to make a reasoned determination whether
to impose the death penalty.3 7 Furthermore, due process forbids states
from sentencing defendants to death on the basis of information which
3 a8
the defendant had "no opportunity to deny or explain.
Parole ineligibility is a relevant factor for jurors to consider under the
Due Process Clause when sentencing a defendant. 3 9 Any sentencing authority "must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when
it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose."' 4
Permitting a defendant to inform sentencing jurors that he is parole
ineligible satisfies due process by allowing the defendant to explain or
4
deny information that the sentencing jury considers. '
New Mexico has addressed Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment principles in determining whether to inform capital sentencing jurors of the
42
length of time a defendant must serve before becoming eligible for parole.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has determined that a defendant's period
of parole ineligibility is a relevant consideration for the sentencing jury
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 but not under the Eighth Amendment .44

A.

Parole Ineligibility and the Eighth Amendment
New Mexico first addressed whether a jury may consider a defendant's
parole ineligibility during sentencing deliberations in State v. Clark.45 In

35. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2195 (Defendant argued that the sentencing jury would not
choose to impose the death penalty if they were informed that the defendant would be ineligible
for parole or would have to serve a very long sentence before becoming eligible if he were sentenced
to life imprisonment.).
36. Compare U.S. CoNs. amend. XIV (providing "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law") with U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII (stating "nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
37. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
38. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
39. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194.
40. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 275.
41. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1 (explaining that elemental due process principles require
admission of the defendant's relevant information to rebut the prosecution's case for death when
the prosecution relies upon future dangerousness).
42. See State v. Clark (Clark 1), 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1989); Clark v. Tansy
(Clark I1), 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527 (1994).
43. See Clark II, 118 N.M. at 493, 882 P.2d at 534 (holding that due process permits a defendant
to inform the sentencing jury the length of incarceration he must serve without parole if sentenced
to life imprisonment instead of death).
44. See Clark I, 108 N.M. at 294, 772 P.2d at 328 (holding that the length of time a capital
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment must serve before becoming eligible for parole is not a
mitigating factor for the jury to consider under the Eighth Amendment).
45. 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322 (1989).
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Clark I, defense counsel, in his opening statement, argued to the jury
that Clark should not be released into society.4 6 Clark's defense strategy
was designed to convince the jury that if Clark were sentenced to life,
he would pose no future threat to society. 47 Additionally, defense counsel
moved the trial court to sentence Clark on the noncapital charges prior
to the jury's deliberations in order to fix the length of time Clark would
serve before becoming eligible for parole.48 The trial court refused Clark's
motion. However, the court did allow Clark to inform the jury about
the possible noncapital sentencing options available 49 under the Criminal
Sentencing Act.5 0
Clark argued that he would pose no future threat to society if sentenced
to life. 5 Clark introduced a chart explaining to the jury the length of
time he could serve on various sentencing alternatives and the effect of
good time reductions5 2 on a life sentence. 3 In addition, Clark called a
State Corrections Department administrator as an expert witness to explain
the chart. 4 On cross examination of the expert, the state highlighted a
difference of opinion between the Corrections Department and the State
Attorney General's office over the issue of whether meritorious deductions
could be applied to a life sentence." If meritorious deductions were
applied, Clark could be released as early as age forty-six.16 The expert
also disclosed that other factors-commutation, judicial decisions, and
policy changes-could affect Clark's life sentence. 7
The prosecution responded to the issue of parole by emphasizing Clark's
future dangerousness as a reason to choose the death penalty. 8 Clark's

46. Id. at 294, 772 P.2d at 328.
47. Id. at 295, 772 P.2d at 329.
48. Id. at 293-94, 772 P.2d at 327-28.
49. Id. at 293, 772 P.2d at 327 (explaining that Clark faced an eighteen year sentence for the
kidnapping. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1987). Additionally, upon hearing
evidence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the court could increase or decrease the eighteenyear sentence by one third. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). The court then
would decide whether the sentence would be served concurrently or consecutively with the sentence
imposed for Clark's previous conviction. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-21 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Finally, Clark's basic sentence was subject to a one-year enhancement for the use of a firearm as
well as a one-year enhancement under the habitual offender statute. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3118-16(A) and -17(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
50. Clark 1, 108 N.M. at 292, 772 P.2d at 327.
51. Id. at 295, 772 P.2d at 329.
52. Section 33-2-34 of the New Mexico Statutes provides that any inmate confined in the
penitentiary may be awarded a meritorious deduction of thirty days per month for his good conduct
under the Corrections Act. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-2-34 (Repl. Pamp. 1987 & Supp. 1988).
53. Clark I, 108 N.M. at 295, 772 P.2d at 329. The chart showed that if Clark received a life
sentence and maximum leniency from the court on the kidnapping charge, he would not be eligible
for parole until age sixty-one. Id.
54. Id. at 296, 772 P.2d at 330.
55. Id. Clark's chart was premised upon the assumption that good-time meritorious deductions
were inapplicable towards a life sentence. However, the expert stated during cross examination that
the Corrections Department currently applied meritorious deductions against a prisoner's thirty year
minimum life sentence.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. In closing argument the prosecutor stated:
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defense counsel made no objections during the prosecutor's cross examination or closing argument.5 9 Clark appealed the court's refusal to
impose sentence on the noncapital charges prior to the jury's deliberations.
On review, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the potential period
of incarceration facing a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment does0
not qualify as a relevant mitigating factor under the Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, the Court held that the trial court judge did not abuse his
discretion by delaying sentencing on the noncapital charges. 6l
Clark also argued on appeal that the prosecution improperly introduced
Clark's future parole eligibility in cross-examination and closing argu-

ments. 62 The supreme court rejected Clark's argument. 6 3 The court ex-

plained that because defense counsel failed to preserve error for appeal,
review on appeal is discretionary unless the issue involves fundamental
error."
65
The court held that fundamental error did not apply in Clark's case.
Clark introduced the issue of parole as part of his case, and consequently,
the prosecutor was entitled to respond to defense counsel's arguments.6
Fundamental error, the court concluded, has no place "where the defendant by his own actions created the error

....

6,

Parole Ineligibility and the Due Process Clause
In Simmons v. South Carolina,68 the United States Supreme Court held
that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defendant's parole
ineligibility when the prosecution argued future dangerousness, deprived
the defendant of due process. 69 In Simmons, the defendant was sentenced
to death for the murder of an elderly woman. 70 Simmons was ineligible
for parole because of two prior convictions for violent offenses. 7'
B.

[Defense counsel] talked briefly about sentencing in this case and the possible length
of time. The question is not when Terry Clark will get out-it's, I'm sorry, it's
not if Terry Clark will get out, it's when he'll get out. It is inevitable. And as
we tried to point out to you on cross examination when this man, if this man is
sentenced to life, there are no guarantees. No guarantees. Somewhere down the
road is another victim. Whether it's ten years from tomorrow, twenty years from
tomorrow, or longer, she's out there, or she will be out there.
Clark I, 108 N.M. at 296, 772 P.2d at 330.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 294, 772 P.2d at 328. The Court stated that relevant mitigating circumstances under
the Eighth Amendment are facts about the defendant's character or background or the circumstances
of the particular offense that call for a penalty less than death.
61. Id. at 295, 772 P.2d at 329.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331.
64. Id. at 296, 772 P.2d at 330. Fundamental error is "to be applied only under exceptional
circumstances and solely to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331.
65. Id.
66. Clark I, 108 N.M. at 297-98, 772 P.2d at 331-32.
67. Id. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332.
68. 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
69. Id. at 2190.
70. Id.
71. Id. Simmons pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with
two prior assaults on elderly women. The guilty pleas resulted in convictions for violent offenses
which rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted for any subsequent violent offense.
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Defense counsel sought to explain to the jury that Simmons was

ineligible for parole in an effort to rebut the prosecution's argument that
Simmons' future dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider in
imposing the death penalty. 72 However, the trial court prohibited the73
defense from making any reference to parole ineligibility during the trial.
Additionally, the court refused Simmons' requested instruction that would
have defined the meaning of a life sentence. 74 During deliberations, the
jury sent a note to the judge which asked "Does the imposition of a
life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" ' 75 The judge instructed
the jury not to consider parole eligibility
in reaching a verdict. 76 The
77
jury returned with a death sentence.
In a plurality decision, the Supreme Court relied on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn Simmons' death sentence. 7 The Court explained that due process prohibits execution based79
upon information the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain.
The Court concluded that the jury reasonably may have believed that
Simmons would be released on parole if the death penalty were not
imposed .80
Furthermore, the prosecution's argument that Simmons represented a
future threat to society encouraged this misunderstanding of the sentencing
alternatives available to the jury."1 Thus, the State secured a death penalty

72. Id. at 2191. The prosecution argued that the question for the jury was "what to do with
[petitioner] now that he is in our midst." Id. at 2203. Furthermore, the prosection argued that a
death sentence would be "a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be
an act of self-defense." Id.
73. Id. at 2190 (the court barred the defense from asking any questions during voir dire or trial
about the subject of parole).
74. Simmons 114 S. Ct. at 2192. The requested instruction reads:
I charge you that these sentences mean what they say. That is, if you recommend
that the defendant Jonathan Simmons be sentenced to death, he actually will be
sentenced to death and executed. If, on the other hand you recommend that he
be sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment
in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life.
In your deliberations you are not to speculate that these sentences mean anything
other than what I have just told you, for what I told you is exactly what will
happen to the defendant depending on what your sentencing decision is.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The judge's instructions included the following:
You are instructed not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your
verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for
your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be
understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2192.
79. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)).
80. Id. at 2193.
81. Id. at 2190-91. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's future
dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider when deliberating whether to impose the death
penalty. See supra note 72.
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based upon Simmons' future dangerousness while concealing from the
jury that Simmons was ineligible for parole, and therefore posed no
threat to society.8 2 As a result, the Court stated, "it is clear that the
State denied petitioner due process. '83
IV. RATIONALE
Before addressing Clark's claims, the court in Clark II, determined
whether principles' of collateral estoppel barred a prisoner from relitigating
claims in his petition for habeas corpus that had already been decided
on a previous appeal.8 4 In his petition for habeas corpus, Clark raised
85
many of the same arguments decided in Clark I on direct appeal. The
New Mexico Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel principles bar6
relitigation of issues decided on a previous habeas corpus petition.
However, Clark's petition did not raise issues decided on a previous
concerned the preclusive
habeas corpus petition.8 7 Instead, Clark's petition
88
effect of issues decided on direct appeal.
The court explained that the purpose of the habeas corpus writ is to9
8
protect the individual from erroneous deprivation of life or liberty.
Thus, principles of finality do not apply the same way in a habeas corpus
proceeding as they do in regular litigation. 90 As a result, a habeas petitioner
may relitigate issues decided against him on direct appeal when the
petitioner can show an intervening change of law or fact, or that the
ends of justice would otherwise be served. 9'
Clark contended that the State improperly presented his future dangerousness to the jury as a reason to choose the death penalty, while
preventing Clark from explaining the length of time he would serve if
sentenced to life. 92 After Clark lost this issue on direct appeal to the
New Mexico Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court decided
Simmons v. South Carolina.93 Simmons changed previous law and held
that when the prosecution urges a defendant's future dangerousness as
reason to impose the death sentence, a defendant must be allowed the
94
opportunity to inform the sentencing jury that he is parole ineligible.
This decision, along with the nature of the writ of habeas corpus and

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
habeas
corpus
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2193.

Id.
Clark 1I, 118 N.M. 486, 490, 882 P.2d 527, 531 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id:
Id.
Id. Collateral estoppel principles prevent relitigation of issues raised and decided on a previous
corpus petition. Id. The preclusive effect given to issues raised in the first petition for habeas
which were decided on direct appeal are in a different posture. Id.
Id.
Clark 11, 118 N.M. at 492, 882 P.2d at 533.
Id. at 489, 882 P.2d at 530.
114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
Id. at 2190. See also supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
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the qualitative difference of death from other punishments, 9 persuaded
the Clark II court to readdress Clark's claim that the length of his
imprisonment should have been disclosed to the jury prior to their

deliberations. 96
The court specifically relied on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause in deciding Clark's claims. 97 The majority of the Clark II court
agreed with Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Simmons that the
Eighth Amendment requires the jury to be advised of the significance
of a life sentence in death penalty sentencing proceedings. 98 Notwithstanding their agreement, the court declined to decide Clark's petition
under the Eighth Amendment" or under Article II, section 13 of the
New Mexico Constitution, 01 because a majority of the Supreme Court
did not decide Simmons on Eighth Amendment grounds.' 0'
In Clark II, the court explained that Clark I held that the period of
incarceration facing a defendant sentenced to life is not a mitigating
circumstance under the Eighth Amendment. 02 However, Clark I failed
to address whether the potential period of confinement was relevant
mitigating evidence under the Due Process Clause. 03 The Clark II court
determined that due process allows the defendant to "rebut, with all
mitigating evidence, the prosecutor's argument that the defendant's future
dangerousness is cause for the death penalty."' 0 4 Thus, the term of
imprisonment the defendant must serve if he is not sentenced to death
is relevant mitigating evidence within the Due Process Clause. 05
Because Clark was not eligible for parole until age eighty-six, the court
concluded that the jury must have misunderstood the sentencing alternatives it could choose. 0 6 As a result, the state secured a death sentence
while concealing from Clark's jury the true meaning of its sentencing
alternatives. 0 7 The Clark II court held that trial courts must instruct the
jury on the length of a life sentence facing a defendant so the jury may
meaningfully consider life imprisonment as an alternative to the death
penalty. 08 This must be done before the jury deliberates on the death
penalty and only if the defendant requests that the jury be given this

95. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
96. Clark 11, 118 N.M. at 489, 882 P.2d at 530.
97. Id. at 490, 882 P.2d at 531.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
100. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
101. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193 n.4.
102. Clark 11, 118 N.M. at 492, 882 P.2d at 533.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Clark 11, 118 N.M.at 492, 882 P.2d at 533. Assuming good time deductions for his noncapital
convictions, Clark, who was 31 years old at the time of sentencing, would have to serve at least
55 years before becoming eligible for parole at age 86. See also supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 493, 882 P.2d at 534.
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information.' °9 To withhold this information after the defendant requests

an instruction would violate his due process right to present the jury
with accurate information to rebut the prosecution's case for death." 0
Furthermore, the Clark II court overruled State v. Henderson,"' and
held that the trial court has no discretion to delay sentencing on capital
2
charges if the defendant asserts this as relevant mitigating evidence." If
the defendant is sentenced prior to the jury's deliberations, the jury will
be able to firmly fix when the defendant will become eligible for parole
if sentenced to life." 3 This evidence will give 4the defendant the opportunity

to rebut the prosecution's case for death."

Moreover, the Clark II court cautioned that the jury must not be given
incomplete information that allowed it to speculate about future legislative
or executive actions." 5 Thus, arguments about whether meritorious de6
ductions could be applied to a life sentence were improper." Such
unsubstantiated arguments allowed the jury to speculate about matters
that were beyond proof and would not be reconciled with the requirement
sentencing discretion be limited and directed to ensure
that the jury's
17
reliability.
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

Creating Reversible Error
The holding in Clark II is at odds with the facts presented in Clark
I. In Clark II, the court based its decision in part on the impropriety

A.

of the State's argument that Clark's future dangerousness was a reason
'
for the jury to choose the death penalty." However, Clark I explained

that defense counsel first introduced the subject of future dangerousness

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 109 N.M. 655, 789 P.2d 603 (1990), overruled by 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527 (1994). In
Henderson, the defendant appealed the trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on the meaning
of a life sentence-a defendant must serve at least 30 years in prison before becoming eligible for
parole. Henderson, 109 N.M. at 659, 789 P.2d at 607. The defendant contended that instruction
was crucial because during voir dire, several jurors who served on Henderson's jury indicated their
belief that a life sentence meant a defendant served as little as 10 years. Id. at 658, 789 P.2d at
606. The New Mexico Supreme Court vacated Henderson's death sentence ruling that the jury must
have before it all relevant information about the defendant. Id. Furthermore, the court held that
the jurors' erroneous misunderstanding of the length of a life sentence oriented them towards
choosing the death penalty. Id. at 659, 789 P.2d at 607. Therefore, the trial court erred by not
tendering Henderson's requested instruction and restoring a proper balance to the jury's deliberations.
Id. The Henderson decision, however, did not require trial courts to sentence capital defendants
prior to the jury's deliberations. Id. Instead, the trial courts could sentence the defendant or they
could instruct the jury on the range of sentences facing the defendant. Id. The court distinguished
Henderson from Clark by explaining that Clark chose to instruct the jury on his length of
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id.
112. Clark I, 118 N.M. at 493, 882 P.2d at 534.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Clark II, 118 N.M. 486, 492, 882 P.2d 527, 533 (1994).
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as part of its case in chief."19 The prosecutor in Clark I merely responded
to defense counsel's arguments. 20 In Clark II, the court characterized
the prosecution's actions at trial as "concealing from the sentencing jury
the true meaning of its noncapital sentencing alternative.' 12 Yet Clark
I demonstrated that information about the sentencing alternatives available

was given to the jury rather than being concealed from

it.122

The Clark II court did not acknowledge the specific facts in Clark L
The impact this oversight may have upon future cases is difficult to
predict. One possible implication is that defendants may use the sentencing
hearing as an opportunity to create reversible error on appeal by presenting
improper arguments to the sentencing jury. 23 A second possibility is that
Clark H will be read to suggest that concealment occurs when the
prosecutor responds to the defendant's argument, thus stripping the prosecution of its right to rebut the defendant's case.
To avoid such confusion, the court could have premised its rationale
on the argument that due process is violated by jurors' misunderstanding
of available sentencing options. When jurors have an inaccurate understanding of the defendant's parole eligibility, the defendant is sentenced
to death on the basis of information he cannot deny or explain thus
violating due process. 24 The Court could have reasoned that due process
demands that the defendant have the opportunity to provide the jury
with accurate information to clear up any misconception and to ensure
that the jury's ultimate sentencing determination is reliable.
B.

Clark I Broadens Simmons' Protections
The Clark II decision broadened the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Simmons v. South Carolina.2 s The Simmons holding is very
narrow, applying only when (1) the state emphasizes the defendant's
future dangerousness as reason to choose the death penalty and (2) the
defendant is parole ineligible under state law. 2 6 The Clark II court
119. Clark , 108 N.M. 288, 297, 772 P.2d 322, 331 (Ct. App. 1989).
120. Id. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332. "Once the issue was introduced it was not surprising that the
prosecutor, in rebuttal, sought to point out all of the factors which bear upon the possibility of
release after conviction of a life sentence." Id. (emphasis added).
121. Clark 11, 118 N.M. at 492, 882 P.2d at 533.
122. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
123. Clark I acknowledged that it was error to place the issues of parole eligibility and postsentencing occurrences before the jury. See Clark I, 108 N.M. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332. However,
the court refused Clark's claim that fundamental error occurred in the sentencing hearing. Id. To
invoke the fundamental error doctrine where a defendant creates error by his own actions would
violate the doctrine's purpose to guard against "the corruption of justice." Id. The Clark II court
did not address the Clark I court's reasoning for refusing Clark's claim of error.
124. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
125. 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
126. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion would seem to suggest that the holding applies even
where the defendant is not parole ineligible under state law: "In assessing future dangerousness,
the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant." Simmons, 114 S.
Ct. at 2194. However, further language in the opinion indicates otherwise: "The State may not
create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never will
be released on parole." Id. at 2198.
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expanded Simmons by holding that "the Due Process Clause assures the
defendant a right to have the jury informed of the period of his parole
ineligibility.' ' 27 The insertion of the word period assures all capital defendants the opportunity to inform sentencing juries how long they must
serve on a life sentence before becoming eligible for parole.' 28 Thus, in
New Mexico, capital defendants do not have to be absolutely "parole
ineligible" in order to provide juries with information about their length
of incarceration. 29 As a result, the Clark II court provides capital defendants with greater constitutional protection during death penalty sentencing proceedings than the Supreme Court determined were mandated
under the Federal Constitution.
The Need for Clarification on Future Dangerousness
Clark II purports to follow Simmons, which requires the State to argue
the defendant's future dangerousness as reason to choose the death penalty
before the jury may be apprised of the defendant's parole ineligibility. 30
However, Clark II also uses language which suggests that the State does
not need to argue future dangerousness in order for the defendant to
be able to inform the jury about his length of incarceration if sentenced
to life imprisonment.' The court states:
C.

The length of incarceration facing a capital defendant before he can
be considered for parole, as an alternative to a death sentence, is
information that must be provided to a jury before it deliberates on
the capital charge if the defendant decides it is in his best interest
to have the jury apprised of this information. To withhold this
information after it is requested violates the petitioner's due process
presented to the jury to rebut the
right to have accurate information
32
prosecution's case for death.

The court should clarify whether the sentencing jury must always be
apprised of the defendant's period of parole ineligibility or whether this
rule only applies when the State argues the defendant's future dangerousness as reason to choose the death penalty. If sentencing juries must
always be apprised of the defendant's parole eligibility regardless of
whether the defendant's future dangerousness is directly at issue, then
the court's reliance on Simmons as support for their decision has eroded.
The court's decision will have disregarded the central premise underlying
Simmons that if the State urges the defendant's future dangerousness as
reason to choose the death penalty, then due process requires that the

127. Clark 11, 118 N.M. at 491, 882 P.2d at 532.
128. See id.
129. But see State v. Price, 448 S.E.2d 827, 831 (N.C. 1994) ("We think the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Simmons is limited to those situations where the alternative to a
sentence of death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole.").
130. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194.
131. See Clark I1, 118 N.M. at 492, 882 P.2d at 533.
132. Id.
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sentencing jury must be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. 3 3
D. Clark II's Reasoning is Ultimately Correct
The Clark II court correctly recognizes that there is little practical
difference between Clark spending fifty-five years in prison and spending
life.3 4 Thus, the due process rationale supporting informing the jury
about the defendant's parole eligibility applies in both cases. Furthermore,
if the jury is concerned that the defendant will pose a future threat to
society, the information that the defendant will serve twenty, thirty, or
fifty-five years in prison before becoming eligible for parole may assuage
their fears.
Juries invariably consider future dangerousness regardless of whether
the State argues the issue.' 35 To the extent that juries consider future
dangerousness in making a sentencing determination, they must be presented with accurate information whether the defendant will in fact present
a future threat to society. Failure to present the jury with accurate
information about its sentencing options results in jury determinations
that may be
contrary to their "true assessment of the appropriate pun6
ishment."1
Accurate information must also be considered in conjunction with the
erroneous assessments that many jurors have about the length of a life
sentence.' Knowing that a defendant will be sentenced to life, but yet
believing that life means 10 years or less will cause jurors to erroneously
assess the defendant's future threat to society. The danger is that juries
will sentence a defendant to death based on their erroneous assessment
of his future threat and not based on a reasoned determination of whether
death is an appropriate punishment. 3 '
However, trial courts must take special precautions to ensure that Clark
II is not interpreted to allow defendants to bring irrelevant and improper
arguments before the sentencing jury. Additionally, a question that the

133. See Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194.
134. See supra note 106.
135. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 7 (1993) (stating that "about thirty percent of jurors in both life
and death cases believe, incorrectly, that the law requires them to impose a death sentence if the
evidence proves that the defendant will be dangerous in the future.").
136. See William Hood III, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and It's Effect on
Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1627 (1989) (providing that "because the
jury harbors misconceptions about the defendant's eligibility for parole and underestimates the actual
time the defendant would serve, it may impose the death penalty contrary to its true assessment
of the appropriate punishment.").
137. See State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 658, 789 P.2d 603, 606 (1990). One prospective
juror stated that convicts serving a life term usually get out in 10 years. Id. Another juror stated
that some convicts serving life sentences get out in 5 or 6 years and that the death penalty was
more effective in deterring crime. Id. Yet another stated that "life imprisonment means ten years
and they parole out. Is anybody kept in prison for life?" Id.
138. See Eisenberg &Wells, supra note 135, at 7 ("Not surprisingly, jurors assessing dangerousness
attach great weight to the defendant's expected sentence if a death sentence is not imposed. Most
importantly, jurors who believe the alternative to death is a relatively short time in prison tend to
sentence to death. Jurors who believe the alternative treatment is longer tend to sentence to life.").
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New Mexico Supreme Court may face in the future is whether fairness
dictates that the prosecution may also present arguments to the jury
based upon the defendant's parole eligibility. 13 9
VI.

CONCLUSION

Clark v. Tansy (Clark I1) provides capital defendants with greater
tactical control over what information to present to a sentencing jury.
Capital defendants can choose to be sentenced on noncapital charges
before the jury deliberates on the death penalty in order to firmly fix
the defendant's period of parole ineligibility if sentenced to life. Juries
will be able to take into account the defendant's future dangerousness
without speculation about his length of incarceration to determine whether
death is the appropriate punishment. However, the New Mexico Supreme
Court must clarify whether a defendant can always request that the jury
be instructed on his period of parole ineligibility or whether a defendant
can only demand this when the State argues his future dangerousness as
a reason for the jury to choose the death penalty.
THERESA M. MONTOYA

139. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
If the rule changed for defendants, many will think that evenhandedness demands
a change for prosecutors as well. State's attorneys ought to be able to say that if,
ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you do not impose capital punishment upon this
defendant ... he may be walking the streets again in eight years! Many would
not favor the admission of such an argument-but would prefer it to a State scheme
in which the defendants can call attention to the unavailability of parole, but
prosecutors cannot note its availability.
Id. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

